This paper investigates the determinants of voter turnout in a panel dataset of more than 15,000 Italian municipal elections through over a decade (2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013). The estimation results show a significant negative effect of the size of the electorate on voter turnout, and an impact of its demographic structure that is compatible with the political life-cycle hypothesis. Moreover, turnout is systematically higher when municipal elections are held concomitantly as more salient contests, and all indicators of election closeness are estimated to influence voter turnout in the expected direction: turnout is increasing in the number of mayor candidates, it is decreasing in the win margin of the mayor, and it is significantly lower, and by almost seven percentage points, in uncontested elections. Finally, while the overall rate of voter turnout falls by about ten percentage points during the period I analyze, predicted turnout on observables shows no declining trend, suggesting that neither demographic trends nor changes in the degree of electoral competition over time can be deemed responsible for the observed decline in voter turnout.
Introduction
In spite of the widespread process of decentralization of power to local governments across the developed as well as the developing world during the 1980s and 1990s (Henderson and McEwen, 2010) , voter turnout in local elections has remained systematically lower than turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections (Hajnal and Lewis, 2003) . Moreover, the most recent years saw voter turnout in local elections decline just as rapidly as in national elections.
Low and declining rates of participation in local elections raise a number of concerns, particularly with reference to the potential distortion of choices in conventional areas of decentralized policy-making (health, education, social care, and environmental protection, to name the most frequently encountered) that might be caused by unequal representation of interests of the diverse segments of society (Trounstine, 2009) . This calls for an understanding of the causes and the identification of the possible remedies to low and declining voter turnout rates in decentralized structures of government.
Due to the lack of systematic data on local elections, though, the empirical investigation of the factors explaining voter turnout in municipal races has lagged behind, and the existing evidence is sparse. 1 This paper aims at shedding light on this issue by taking advantage of a large panel dataset of Italian mayoral elections (over 6,000 authorities through more than a decade). Importantly, I can rely on official data on all municipal elections held in those municipalities during 2002 to 2013 (Ministry of the Interior), and merge them with detailed demographic data (National Statistics Institute).
The institutional set up of the analysis is particularly attractive: municipal elections in Italy garner considerable attention due to the traditionally important and recently increasing role played by directly elected mayors both in rural and in metropolitan areas, and to the unusually large rates (frequently exceeding 80%) of voter turnout.
In analyzing the determinants of voter turnout, I start from a number of variables that are measured yearly at the administrative unit of analysis and that have proved to play a major role in previous aggregatelevel research on voter turnout (Geys, 2006) . Besides the size and demographic structure of the electorate, I focus on the impact of indicators of uncertainty of the electoral outcome on turnout. I employ indices that share a common underlying rationale: citizens should be more likely to turn out in an uncertain election, where the chances are higher that their vote counts and can change the election outcome, than in an election where the outcome is easily predictable either because a candidate mayor runs uncontested, or because he is confronted by no credible opponent (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Feddersen, 2004) .
Higher electoral uncertainty, however measured, should therefore be predicted to boost voter turnout -a well established result in the existing literature (Geys, 2006) . In the absence of ex ante measures of electoral uncertainty, I construct a number of ex post indicators at each of the over 15,000 municipal elections that occurred during that decade. I test the effect of those indicators with a fixed effects estimator that controls for observable as well as unobservable time-invariant municipal characteristics thus virtually ruling out the risk of attributing to included explanatory variables an effect that is in reality due to omitted local traits, and exploits within-municipality variation in the variables of interest to estimate the key parameters of the voter turnout equation.
The main results of the empirical analysis can be briefly summarized as follows. First, I find that electoral uncertainty (in terms of the degree to which an election is contested and of the win margin of the mayor) is a key determinant of individuals' participation decision. In line with the idea of instrumental voters participating in larger numbers when the outcome of the election is uncertain, I find that turnout is increasing in the number of mayor candidates, it is decreasing in the win margin of the mayor, and it is significantly lower, and by almost seven percentage points, in uncontested elections. As for the size of the electorate, the rational voting theory predicts a negative effect of the number of eligible voters on turnout due to its depressing effect on the probability of casting the decisive vote. Such negative effect is generally found in the empirical literature based on aggregate data, and it clearly emerges from my estimates too. However, since I use a within-group estimator where the main source of changes in the electorate is due to internal migration flows, part of the effect is likely due to heterogeneous propensities to vote by newly immigrated citizens relative to more senior residents. Finally, I find the municipal age structure to have a strong influence on voting behavior: in line with the existing individual-level based evidence, turnout is highest amongst people in their 40s and 50s, and lowest among younger and elderly voters, in line with the political life-cycle hypothesis (Smets and van Ham, 2013) .
As far as the causes of the secular decline in turnout are concerned, the variables that constitute the traditional determinants of voting in the applied literature and that I have employed in my empirical analysis explain a reasonable portion of the within-municipality variation in voter participation, but are unable to account for the considerable fall in turnout that has taken place during the period analyzed here.
The major question that remains to be addressed in future work is the identification of the drivers of the overall declining trend in participation in local elections.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the institutional framework and the analysis and section 4 performs a number of sensitivity checks. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional framework and dataset
The municipal level of government is the oldest administrative jurisdiction in Italy, and is highly fragmented. The total number of municipalities exceeds 8,000, with average population size of around 7,000 inhabitants (table 1). The number of cities above 100,000 inhabitants is only around 40, just two of them exceeding one million residents, with more than half of localities having less than 3,000 residents.
Municipal authorities' role as an autonomous and representative level of government is explicitly defined in the Constitution, according to which they are statutorily responsible, irrespective of their size, for the provision of a number of crucial public services in two main areas. 2 The first area concerns environmentrelated services and includes urban public transport, road maintenance and cleaning, waste collection and management, water and sewer services, environmental monitoring and protection, planning, zoning elections during that period, though some voted more often, as shown in table 2. For instance, since elections in Italian municipalities take place every fifth year, the municipalities having early elections in 2 The sole exception is the possibility (or obligation in some instances) for small-sized municipalities to set up an intermunicipal cooperation institution for the provision of public services that require a minimum scale of production.
6 the sample period (2002 and 2003) were supposed to -and most of the times did -vote again five and ten years later, thus recording three regularly spaced election events.
As for voting requirements, voting is formally mandatory for all Italian citizens that reside in a given municipality and are aged above 18. No sanctions exist for abstainers, though. Voters express a vote for a mayor candidate as well as for a councillor candidate if they wish. 3 While the members of the council and the mayor are all elected in a direct ballot, in larger localities (population > 15,000 inhabitants) the two most voted mayor candidates face a runoff stage if none gets more than 50% of the votes in the first stage. Importantly for the purposes of our empirical analysis, the election schedule across the country is staggered, meaning that several elections occurred in each of the 2002-2013 years, as shown in table 3. Table 3 shows that turnout in municipal elections is pretty high, though it has declined during the decade from close to 80% to less than 70%. Figure 1 shows that the decline in voter turnout is not unique to local 
Empirical analysis
I model empirically the turnout rate in municipality n in election year t (τn,t) in equation (1) below. Equation (1) includes a constant (c), a time-invariant locality-specific effect reflecting the stable socioeconomic environment (e.g., the quality of institutions) in which elections take place (in), and an year effect that is common to all localities having elections in that year and that captures the effects of national politics and the macroeconomy on participation to local elections (m t ). Moreover, I include a vector of 3 Two thirds of the council seats are assigned to the councillor candidates (frequently grouped in one or more parties) supporting the mayor that is elected. election-specific features such as the number of candidates, the size of the electorate, and the uncertainty of the election outcome (xn,t), and a vector of age shares of the voting population (s(a)), along with an i.i.d error term (εn,t): τn,t = c + in + mt + Σ a γas(a)n,t + xn,t'β + εn,t
(1) I estimate the turnout determination equation (1) Turnout in local elections is generally lower than turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections. As emerges from the enormous empirical research on aggregate data (Geys, 2006) and individual-level data (Smets and van Ham, 2013) , the determinants of voter turnout include the stakes and salience of the elections, the degree of political competition, the number and characteristics of candidates, the cost of voting, and, most importantly, the size, socioeconomic composition, and demographic structure of the electorate.
I first focus on the effects of the size and age structure of the electorate on turnout. As for the size of the electorate, the rational voting theory predicts a negative effect of the number of eligible voters on turnout due to its depressing effect on the probability of casting the decisive vote. Such negative effect is generally found in the empirical literature based on aggregate data (Geys, 2006) , and it clearly emerges from my estimates too. The within groups estimation results of a turnout determination equation reported in table 5 show that the size of the electorate has a negative and significant impact on turnout, both in the linear specification (columns (5.1) and (5.2)) and in a double-log specification (columns (5.3) and (5.4)).
The latter returns an estimate of the elasticity of turnout with respect to the size of the electorate of around -0.2.
It is tempting to view this result as a confirmation of the theoretical hypothesis of rational voting, according to which the instrumental motive for voting -in terms of the probability of casting the decisive vote -falls for all voters as the electorate gets larger. However, this is not the only possible cause of a negative impact of the size of the electorate on turnout. In fact, sizeable peacetime changes in the size of the electorate in a jurisdiction are typically due either to historical variation in the dimension of the 8 cohorts of teen-agers entering the electorate for the first time, or to time-series variation in the number of immigrants. A negative within-municipality correlation between electorate size and turnout rate would therefore result either from younger voters showing lower turnout rates than mature ones -the conventional 'political life-cycle' hypothesis (Smets, 2016 ) -or from recent immigrants being less likely to vote than tenured residents (Squire et al., 1987) .
Consequently, I look at the impact of the age composition of the electorate on turnout. While I do not directly observe the demographic composition of the electorate, I have detailed information on the demographic composition of the whole resident population at the municipal level, and define the following age groups: Smets and van Ham (2013) , turnout is low among the youth, it rises with the transition into adulthood, and it declines again when citizens age and start to withdraw from social life (the political life-cycle hypothesis). 4 Table 6 reports the results of estimation of equation (1), where turnout is regressed on the age group shares (2), as well as on the size of the electorate. All coefficient estimates have the expected signs and most of them are statistically significant. As for demographics, age structure has a strong influence on voting behavior: in line with the existing individual-level based evidence, turnout is highest amongst people in their 40s and 50s, and lowest among young and elderly voters. Interestingly, the strong negative effect of the size of the electorate on the rate of turnout is robust to the inclusion of the age group shares, thus lending support to the instrumental voter hypothesis: even when controlling for the age structure of the electorate, the number of voters is estimated to have a negative impact on the rate of turnout.
However, I cannot rule out the hypothesis that large increases in the electorate due to internal migration cause a decrease in turnout because newly immigrated citizens have lower propensity to vote than more 4 In general, turnout is highest among middle-aged voters due to their active social role (church attendance, community life, party attachment) and their growing income (Rubenson et al., 2004; Bhatti et al., 2012) . However, the extent to which the effects of period, cohort, and age effects on turnout can actually be identified by relying on micro-level data has been a source of heated debate (Bell and Jones, 2014) .
senior residents. Similarly, the people that outmigrate tend to have lower propensity to vote (they favor exit to voice in Hirschman's (1970) terminology), so turnout increases when they leave.
As for the effect of electoral uncertainty on voter turnout, I measure it in three ways. First, I use the number of mayor candidates, a variable that is likely to be positively correlated both with the actual uncertainty of the electoral outcome (i.e., which of the mayor candidates will eventually be elected) and, more plausibly, with the perceived chances of councillor candidates supporting minority mayor candidates of gaining seats in the local council. Second, I use the win margin of the elected mayor as a proxy of electoral uncertainty. I compute it as the vote difference between the elected mayor and its most voted opponent, expressed as a percentage of total votes cast. Ideally, an ex ante measure of expected vote difference would be preferable, but unfortunately it is not available for municipal elections in Italy.
Finally, I build a dummy variable that equals 1 in uncontested elections. Such variable is of course an accurate description of lack of competition in those local elections where a candidate runs unopposed, but might understimate the true number of non-competitive outcomes by missing those races whose result is easily predictable even in the presence of more than one candidate.
The results are reported in table 7 , and show that all of those indicators of electoral uncertainty have a statistically significant impact on voter turnout, and in the expected direction. In particular, turnout is increasing in the number of mayor candidates and is decreasing in the win margin of the mayor. Further, voter turnout is significantly lower, and by almost seven percentage points, in uncontested elections.
The results are robust in column (7.4), where I allow for the presence of concomitant elections for other tiers of government (provinces, regions, state, and European Parliament). In fact, it is well known that turnout in 'second-order' elections tends to be higher if those elections are held at the same time as more salient, higher stakes contests (Berry and Gersen, 2011; Anzia, 2014; Lo Prete and Revelli, 2014) . 
Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the determinants of voter turnout in a large panel dataset of Italian municipal elections through over a decade. The dataset contains official information on over 15,000 elections that took place in municipal jurisdictions of continental Italy during 2002 to 2013, and is merged with official demographic data at the municipal level. I have explored the effect of a number of variables that have proved to be important drivers of voter turnout in previous aggregate-level research (Geys, 2006) , including the size of the electorate, its demographic structure, the presence of concomitant elections (provincial, regional, national, EU), and a number of indicators of closeness of the electoral outcome on turnout.
The estimation results point to a negative effect of the size of the electorate on turnout rates. As for demographics, age structure has a strong influence on voting behavior: in line with the existing individual-level based evidence, turnout is highest amongst people in their 40s and 50s, and lowest among young and elderly voters. Interestingly, the strong negative effect of the size of the electorate on the rate of turnout is robust to the inclusion of the age group shares, thus lending support to the instrumental voter hypothesis: even when controlling for the age structure of the electorate, the number of voters is estimated to have a negative impact on the rate of turnout. In addition, and by exploiting the fact that municipal elections are staggered, I find that turnout is systematically higher when those elections are held at the same time as more salient, higher stakes contests. Finally, all ex post indicators of electoral uncertainty have a statistically significant impact on voter turnout, and in the expected direction. In particular, turnout is increasing in the number of mayor candidates, it is decreasing in the 12 win margin of the mayor, and it is significantly lower, by almost seven percentage points, in uncontested elections.
As far as the secular decline in turnout is concerned, this analysis suggests that the variables that I have employed here and that constitute the traditional determinants of voting in the empirical literature explain a large portion of the within-municipality variation in voter participation, but are unable to account for the considerable fall in turnout that has taken place during the period analyzed here. The major question that the empirical turnout literature still needs to address is therefore the identification of the drivers of declining rates of participation. One possibility that has been explored at the US county level (Gentzkow, 2006) and at the Italian local government level with regard to the voting choices of Italian citizens for their representatives in the national Parliament (Campante et al., 2013; Durante et al.,, 2015) is the role of the media (from early TV introduction, to the diffusion of Internet) in influencing the consumption of news by citizens and their degree of political activism. The extent to which the changing patterns of news and entertainment consumption can be deemed responsible for the dramatic fall in turnout in municipal elections too seems to represent an interesting topic for future research. 
